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This article maintains that Jean-Paul Sartre’s early masterwork, Being and
Nothingness, is primarily concerned with developing an original approach to
the being of consciousness. Sartre’s ontology resituates the Cartesian cogito
in a complete system that provides a new understanding of negation and a
dynamic interpretation of human existence. The article examines the role of
consciousness, temporality and the relationship between self and others in the
light of Sartre’s arguments against “classical” rationalism. The conclusion sug-
gests that Sartre’s departure from modern foundationalism has “postmodern”
implications that emerge in the areas of ontology, existential analytics and the
ethics of human freedom.
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that Jean-Paul Sartre’s Being and
Nothingness (L’être et le néant, 1943) responds in decisive ways to the Carte-
sian legacy in developing an original ontology that underlies the philosopher’s
commitment to existentialism. In arguing that Sartre is in dialogue with the
rationalist tradition, we shall maintain that he is a “postcartesian,” not primarily
in the minimal sense of coming after René Descartes, but rather in the stronger
sense of responding to the philosophical challenge of his “classical” predeces-
sor. This stronger claim also means that Sartre sometimes adopts an adversarial
relationship to Cartesian ontology. Our approach to Sartre’s attempt to address
the question of being will allow us to examine four integral concerns, namely,
(i) the structure of consciousness as conscious being, (ii) the nature of tempo-
rality, (iii) the role of the cogito in clarifying the existence of other persons and
(iv) the significance of freedom to “postmodern” accounts of the modern con-
dition. These four concerns will be interrelated in a way that argues in favor of
Sartre’s distinctive contribution to existential phenomenology.
I
While early commentators on Sartre’s work did not hesitate to discuss the influ-
ence of Descartes on Being and Nothingness, we might begin by reconsidering
this influence from two different standpoints. First, Sartre’s early philosophy
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is often described as a philosophy of consciousness because of the role that
it assigns to conscious reflection in mental life. To the degree that this inter-
pretation can be sustained, Sartre’s work in phenomenology would seem to
be Cartesian in the classical sense. Is it not the case that Sartre dismisses
the Freudian notion of an unconscious as inherently self-contradictory? More-
over, Sartre’s early rejection of determinism would presumably prevent him
from easily accepting the economic orientation of a philosophy like Marx-
ism. An emphasis on consciousness in philosophy would seem to go along
with methodological individualism, which would preclude the construction of
synthetic concepts like class and social interest that perform a special role in
Marxist analyses. Finally, and in a different vein, Sartre’s rationalist tenden-
cies might elevate conscious thought in a manner that would foreclose any
serious dialogue with religious traditions. The principle that all beliefs must be
grounded in evidence in order to be valid, which is implicit if not explicit in
Cartesian philosophy, seems to disallow a respect for the unknown that makes
religious life possible.
However, these apparent limitations would only become binding if Sartre
had adopted Cartesian rationalism as a complete system of knowledge. In
truth, while Sartre is concerned with the epistemological status of knowledge
claims, the approach to the world that he adopts begins with an analysis of con-
sciousness, rather than with the question of validation through evidence. As a
phenomenologist, Sartre contends that consciousness is always consciousness
of something, which means that it exhibits intentions in its engagement with
the world. Moreover, consciousness is irreducible to objective knowledge inso-
far as it always presupposes a pre-reflective awareness of its own activity. What
this means is that my consciousness of a given entity necessarily carries along
with it the awareness that I am conscious of the object intended. To say this
much is to propose that consciousness exhibits a tripartite structure, instead of
upholding a more restrictive epistemological dualism. Knowledge would occur
in a manner that sustained a narrow opposition between knower and known
if it did not involve an implicit awareness of what I know. However, Sartre
prevents us from accepting an impersonal theory of consciousness in specify-
ing how consciousness embraces self-consciousness. I am present to myself in
being conscious of the object intended. Nonetheless, presence to self should
not be confused with self-knowledge: what separates these two concepts not
only helps us distinguish Sartrian phenomenology from Cartesian rationalism
but it also points to a crucial non-objective aspect of consciousness itself.
Sartre clarifies this non-objective component in his analysis of how con-
sciousness differs from being as such. In discussing how objectifying inten-
tions are empty ones, Sartre maintains that consciousness produces itself “as
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a revelation of a being which it is not and which gives itself as already exist-
ing when consciousness reveals it.”1 However, the division that occurs within
consciousness cannot be understood in terms of a simple relation between sub-
ject and object. This division presupposes the attempt to lay claim to being
that occurs in every objective experience. In criticizing a foundational con-
cept of reason, Sartre argues that pre-reflective awareness is what provides
relative security to conscious thought. Cartesian rationalism falls short of its
goals when it confuses knowledge with ontology. In taking up this criticism,
however, Sartre does not identify his own position with relativism, since con-
sciousness is an experience that cannot be limited in this way. His quarrel with
Descartes does not involve the affirmation of a lesser knowledge: “The onto-
logical error of Cartesian rationalism is not to have seen that if the absolute is
defined by the primacy of existence over essence, it cannot be conceived as a
substance.”2
Sartre’s divergence from Descartes is nowhere clearer than in the role that
negation performs in the phenomenon of consciousness as considered in its
everyday modalities. The difference between two entities can be grasped in
terms of an external negation. Hence the subject, observing that the chair is
not an inkwell, judges two objects to be mutually distinct. However, Sartre
contends that the subject who reflects on a given entity is present to a self that
remains impossible to identify in substantial terms: “The self therefore rep-
resents an ideal distance within the immanence of the subject in relation to
himself, a way of not being his own coincidence,” which means that negation
can be grasped as an internal procedure that occurs within the phenomenon
of consciousness.3 Hence, when Sartre contends that the cogito is his point
of departure, he is really contending that a movement beyond the confines of
Cartesian rationalism is necessary before the “structure” of consciousness can
be appraised. It does no good to try to eliminate presence to self as a mere intru-
sion or as the inessential aspect of a cognitive process for the simple reason
that consciousness cannot be identified with itself in a meaningful way. Con-
sciousness is never (mere) consciousness; we cannot claim that consciousness
simply maps onto objective reality when a prereflective dimension complicates
its interface with the world. This prereflective dimension refers back to a sub-
ject, but it cannot be identified as either subject or predicate. Thus, Sartre’s
notion of the self brings into play the shifting “space” within which internal
negation is carried out in every act of consciousness.
Sartre’s phenomenological analysis of internal negation casts light on his
unique conception of nothingness, which should not be confused with rival
conceptions developed by G. W. F. Hegel and Martin Heidegger. Hegel’s
dialectical logic attempts to subordinate nothingness to an ongoing movement
from abstract to concrete, thus testifying to the power of the negative as what
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generates change itself. However, in opposing being and nothingness as the
most abstract moments in a purely logical process, Hegel displaces the cog-
ito as the origin of generation and also obscures the role of nothingness in
psychic life. Sartre responds to this instance of logical reductionism when he
calls attention to “those little pools of non-being which we encounter each
instant in the depth of being.”4 But this metaphorical description should not
be restricted to the domain of empirical psychology. Sartre’s deeper argument
against Hegel can be related to the way that the cogito is evoked as what pro-
duces nothingness, which assumes the significance of anguish whenever the
self confronts its own ontological instability. In this regard, Sartre mentions
that Søren Kierkegaard was the first philosopher to emphasize how anguish,
rather than fear, combines a sense of object-loss with a protective concern for
the self in a single upsurge of emotion. And yet, what Sartre contributes to this
tradition is a strong insistence on the importance of freedom to the “meaning”
of nothingness as it emerges on the margins of the cogito, which had been
repositioned as the site of anguish itself.
We are now in a much better position to compare Sartre and Descartes as
ontologists who, in different ways, confront the relationship between knowl-
edge and being. Sartre takes up the example of Descartes in discussing how
the cogito assumes a reflective role in early modern rationalism. In standard
accounts of Descartes, the being who doubts is hard to separate from the idea
of perfection. Sartre notes that, in the Third Meditation, Descartes uncovers a
cleavage or lack of being “that is more revealing than the scholastic terminol-
ogy that he employs in reissuing earlier versions of the ontological argument.”5
What this means for Sartre is that, when indicating this basic discrepancy,
Descartes at least suggests that the being who doubts cannot be its own founda-
tion. Sartre presents this interpretation of Descartes only after he has pointed
out that a purely methodological conception of doubt is ontologically prob-
lematic. For this reason, the opening of this discrepancy does not reinforce
dualism but helps us understand the instability of the cogito from a new stand-
point. By placing the cogito in this broader context, we help demonstrate that
Sartre’s own thought could never be assimilated in an unambiguous manner to
a dualistic philosophy of consciousness.
It remains to be explained more exhaustively why Sartre’s philosophy is
only inadequately described as dualistic. Certainly Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s
later criticisms of Sartre, which are based on the role that the “for-itself” (pour-
soi) and “in-itself” (en-soi) perform in his philosophy, rest on the assumption
that an oppositional framework runs through his early work and ultimately
prevents him from performing a synthesis of the social.6 While Sartre’s early
position strongly depends on a phenomenology of consciousness, we have
seen that his departure from Cartesian rationalism allows him to identify
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the prereflective with self-consciousness, and that self-consciousness involves
presence to self, rather than self-grounding in the foundational sense. Hence
consciousness involves a “structure” in which presence to self testifies to an
ontological awareness that accompanies any encounter with the world. When
examined from a somewhat different standpoint, Sartre also contends that the
non-conscious in-itself in attempting to found itself can only introduce reflec-
tivity into its being and therefore ceases to be self-identical at the exact moment
that is undergoes nihilation: “The for-itself corresponds then to an expanding
de-structuring of the in-itself, and the in-itself is nihilated and absorbed in its
attempt to found itself.”7 What Sartre calls “facticity” is a remnant of being that
can only remind the for-itself that it lacks ontological justification. It would
seem, therefore, that the for-itself and the in-itself are not mutually exclusive
terms but related notions and operate in a way that should caution us against
interpreting them as two detachable sides of a binary opposition.
In truth, Sartre’s complete rejection of the metaphysical idea that the sub-
ject can be detached from the world is what distances him from traditional
dualism and qualifies his relationship to most philosophies of consciousness.
His early work, The Transcendence of the Ego (La transcendance de l’ego,
1936–37), is based on the radical gesture of placing the ego in the world as
one object among others. Hence, in this early essay, Sartre already turns away
from the “classical” phenomenological notion of a Transcendental Ego as the
seat of consciousness. This does not mean, however, that Sartre conceives of
the subject as merely indifferent to an ego over which it presides as a kind of
reflective agent. Consciousness is present to a self that is distinct from an ego,
just as the movement of consciousness is what allows existence to acquire per-
sonal meaning. In Sartre’s phenomenology, the self does not substitute for the
subject as a new inhabitant of vacant space; on the contrary, “it is an ideal, a
limit” that offers consciousness a reason or motive, without supplying it with
an ultimate standpoint on being-in-the-world.8
What might seem to be of minor importance becomes crucial when Sartre
develops his own concept of “world” as complementary to selfness. Heideg-
ger’s phenomenological concept of world was presented in Being and Time
(Sein und Zeit) as an advance over Descartes, whose subject cannot consti-
tute a totality that remains external to it.9 Sartre, however, shows how a new
understanding of the cogito can assist in the task of clarifying the nature of
a world that is either remembered or always in the process of being consti-
tuted. In attempting to satisfy any present desire, I move toward the world as
it is retained in some particular instance that haunts self-consciousness. To the
degree that it is my own, therefore, I can say that “the world is a fugitive struc-
ture, always present, a structure which I live.”10 The evanescent relationship
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between self and world indicates the role of time in presenting the for-itself
with distinct possibilities for being.
I I
Sartre’s view of the self as situated in time also argues that Being and Nothing-
ness must be read in terms of the on-going development of phenomenology,
which involves a re-examination of how time itself has been interpreted philo-
sophically. The importance of temporality to Heidegger’s philosophical project
can be traced back to his work with Husserl and might be specified as an
attempt to radicalize what was already implicit in early phenomenology. In
Being and Time, Heidegger makes some headway toward developing the the-
sis that the question of time requires a critical overview of modern philosophy
before it can be freed from the legacies of metaphysics. In this regard, both
Descartes and Kant serve as key figures in an analysis of how different concep-
tions of eternity ultimately came to replace a more fundamental sense of time
that permeates Dasein in its being-in-the-world. Heidegger’s “destruction” of
metaphysical time, which emerges in his incomplete survey of modern philos-
ophy, can be read as a prelude to Sartre’s confrontation with temporality in a
different context. Heidegger contends that temporality provides Dasein with
some of its most crucial features, such as finitude, an awareness of death and
the need for resolve that is assumed to be the proper response to a sudden
moment of vision. Does time perform an equally crucial role in Sartre’s own
phenomenology of consciousness?
In considering this question, we might recall how Sartre argues against
Cartesian rationalism by exploring the meaning of internal negation as a phe-
nomenon that clarifies the structure of everyday consciousness. We have seen
how self-consciousness arises in terms of the prereflective, which can be theo-
rized as the site where an internal negation is accomplished within the domain
of consciousness. The broader implications of this insight help demonstrate
how the for-itself constantly negates the present as it recedes into the past.
Sartre contends that this event is continually disruptive so that the process
of becoming cannot be conceived as separation from being. The appropriate
way of grasping the phenomenon of becoming is through the vehicle of con-
sciousness: “The bond between being and non-being can be only internal.”11
In opposing both Descartes and Bergson, Sartre argues that the past is neither
a sequence of time that is discontinuous with the present or a plenitude that
subsists without interruption. On the contrary, the past is not isolated either in
being unrelated to the present or as flowing beneath the domain of conscious
thought. The internal bond that brings the past closer to conscious being also
complicates the way that consciousness moves from one moment to the next.
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Our peculiar relation to the past can be disclosed in terms of how the for-
itself and the in-itself equally engage in attempting to achieve foundational
status. The for-itself seems to become its own foundation when the in-itself
fails to secure being through conscious activity, but consciousness once again
discovers its dependency on the in-itself when it confronts its relationship to
the world. The play between these two tendencies does not allow me to imagine
a form of consciousness that can simply “leap” into the future.
Hence, when applied to matters of temporal concern, the notion of inter-
nal negation either demonstrates how conscious being is immersed in being or
points to a movement “beyond being” itself. First of all, internal negation can-
not simply free consciousness from the past; on the contrary, it demonstrates
how the past lives on, haunting the present as the re-entry of displaced contin-
gency: “The contingency of the for-itself, this weight expressed and preserved
in the very surpassing – this is Facticity.”12 By identifying the past with factic-
ity, Sartre indicates how conscious being is intrinsically temporal on the level
of lived experience. In a similar way, the present can be grasped as “an inter-
nal relation between the being which is present and the beings to which it is
present.”13 At the same time, this internal relation involves negation insofar as
the for-itself bears witness to not being what it experiences in being present
to being. For Sartre, this means that the so-called present is more accurately
described as a mode of presence in a continual state of dissolution. Finally,
the future in not an ideal state that consciousness posits as it attempts to realize
itself. The future cannot be understood in the mode of a representation. It is true
that the future is the “not-yet” through which the for-itself unfolds as a series
of concrete possibilities. Nonetheless, the for-itself is “beyond being” because
it implies an enabling distance within which consciousness can approximate
presence to self.14
Sartre’s argument against “classical” conceptions of the cogito also under-
lies his analysis of static temporality. Here Sartre examines how temporal
succession requires an original approach to the connection between before and
after. Descartes and Immanuel Kant tried to solve the problem of temporal
succession by evoking a privileged standpoint on related moments. Descartes
refers to the perception of God as witness to a continuous creation, whereas
Kant employs the notion of synthetic unity as the basis for understanding the
passage of time. Sartre contends, however, that any attempt to establish the
unity of time from a non-temporal standpoint is basically in error, since “the
problem is not so much to account for the total unity of its upsurge as for the
intratemporal connections of before and after.”15 He concurs with Gottfried
Wilhelm Leibniz that this external viewpoint has allowed Descartes to forget
the continuity of time, but he also argues against Leibniz that the relationship
between before and after cannot be grasped unless both terms can be thought
44 W I L L I A M D . M E L A N E Y
as separate. Moreover, Sartre’s criticism of Leibniz allows him to argue against
Henri Bergson as well, who also fails to recognize that multiplicity can only be
organized through a unifying act. Nonetheless, consciousness cannot provide
us with the key to temporal succession when it is temporal in its being, that is
to say, when consciousness is “a being outside itself.”16
In examining how consciousness is necessarily outside itself in its temporal
constitution, Sartre takes us on a remarkable excursion to demonstrate how
the past continually haunts the mind as a vestige of what cannot be either
left behind or easily accepted. The movement of temporal succession is per-
haps inscribed in the nature of consciousness itself, rather than something that
occurs as an external passage. The past is a necessary aspect of the for-itself
because the act of surpassing implies that something has been surpassed. Sartre
does not only contend that the for-itself exists as its past, but that it brings
the past with it as it enters the world. The sudden appearance of conscious-
ness is said to be “shocking” in the same way that our need to inhabit the
embryo prior to birth is difficult to reconcile with embodied consciousness.
Sartre refers to how the original relation between the for-itself and the in-itself
can only be thought as an “absolute event” that allows the Past to be constituted
in terms of consciousness.17 On the basis of this event, we are able to use the
word before in expressing the “profound solidarity” that indicates how the for-
itself and the in-itself are somehow intertwined. Sartre describes this moment
in phenomenological terms: “Through birth a Past appears in the world.”18 It
would seem, therefore, that the cogito cannot separate itself from the past in
a manner that would allow it to simply eliminate the past as it moves into the
future.
On the other hand, Sartre also discusses the ontology of temporality as a
dynamic process that demonstrates how the present includes the past in its
flight from what it was. Sartre insists that the philosophical problem of change
cannot be understood according to the classical model that assumes the per-
manent existence of entities in time. On the contrary, we should instead try to
conceive of the present as a single upsurge that separates what was from what
will be. The for-itself that lies at the heart of this upsurge is what allows a new
present to transform the present that was into a recent past. Sartre describes this
temporal phenomenon as a “global modification” because it does not merely
concern the past as such but demonstrates how the present bears the past as it
moves into the future.19 However, if this is in fact the case, how can we explain
change as a dynamic occurrence? Sartre responds to this question by claiming
that, once the for-itself is conceived as spontaneity, we must confront the tem-
porality of consciousness as an irreducible aspect of its constitution. Moreover,
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the act of consciousness, as it both posits and refuses its being, has ontolog-
ical priority over change itself, which “is simply the relation of the material
contents of the series.”20
Phenomenology performs a crucial role in Sartre’s subsequent discussion
of original as opposed to psychic temporality, just as it prepares us for the
discourse of the other that constitutes one of his most important early achieve-
ments. Sartre begins this phase of his analysis by criticizing the rationalist
tendency to restrict the meaning of consciousness to acts of immediate imma-
nence. He then observes that, while reflection only bears witness on the basis
of appearances, whatever is reflected-on is altered when it becomes the object
of self-consciousness. Sartre provides a brilliant metaphor to illuminate this
internal object of reflection: “It may be compared – to use one example – to a
man who is writing, bent over a table, and who while writing knows that he is
observed by somebody who stands behind him.”21 Reflection, therefore, opens
the possibility of an outside that informs its activity with a “meaning” that
throws it off-center.22 Of course, Sartre remains committed to phenomenology:
reflection is still a unified activity; however, its “historicity” can be discov-
ered in a mode of dissociation in which both presence to self and the world
reflected-on are united in consciousness.23
Hence the ontological status of reflection provides an opening onto the rela-
tionship between the for-itself and a world that exceeds it but also suggests the
possibility of a new sort of ground. Sartre considers reflection to be a failure
in the ontological sense because it seeks a foundation in the mode of existence
for-others. However, reflection involves negation in a manner that prevents
a movement between the pure for-itself and existence for-others from being
accomplished. This means that reflection cannot dispense with the reflected-
on as an intermediary that establishes the basis for recognition, rather than
for knowledge. Sartre returns to the example of Descartes in reminding us
that methodological doubt cannot supply an ontological ground for the cog-
ito: “Doubt appears on the foundation of a pre-ontological comprehension of
knowing and of requirements concerning truth.”24 Pure reflection allows pre-
ontological comprehension to emerge on the horizon of knowledge, whereas
impure reflection occurs as a series of psychic states that are differently consti-
tuted. Hence pure reflection is irreducible to matters of psychology. Sartre’s
analysis of temporality indicates that the for-itself seeks to found itself as
being-for-others, and also that this move is basically mistaken. Is it possi-
ble, nonetheless, that the relationship between consciousness and other human
beings is in some sense basic to the meaning of consciousness? In order to
answer this question, we must now turn to Sartre’s discussion of whether or not
the existence of the Other is crucial to the way that consciousness functions in
the world.
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I I I
We have arrived at the moment in our discussion when we must inquire into
the role of phenomenology in allowing Sartre to confront the problem of
other minds. Does the sense of self that accompanies the for-itself necessar-
ily presume the existence of others? This very question evokes an old problem
that was frequently examined by realists and idealist alike during the modern
period. In his original discussion of this problem, Sartre considers how the
existence of the external world was only rarely considered in terms of the rela-
tionship between Self and Other. While previous philosophers tried to frame
exterior existence in regrounding knowledge in either a deeper affirmation of
the subject or the object-world, Sartre argues that the Other is encountered but
not constituted.25 This does not allow us to either prove that the external world
exists or disprove its reality. However, before making this bold claim, Sartre
discusses how earlier philosophers have not persuasively argued that the Other
is necessary to the existence of the Self. In dismantling various arguments that
posit the Other without assigning it definite importance, Sartre prepares us for
a phenomenological description of how an encounter between Self and Other
can be philosophically contextualized.
It might seem that Kant would be a useful ally in this campaign to the degree
that transcendental philosophy, properly conceived, entails an ethical agenda
that postulates the mutual accord of autonomous subjects. However, Sartre
clearly objects to the critical distinction between phenomenon and noumenon,
which informs Kantian ethics and epistemology. Kant’s concept of causality
cannot be employed in good faith to “unify my time with that of the Other.”26
The failure of the Other to constitute any experience explains why, in Kant’s
teleology, the Other is placed among regulative concepts. Sartre, in contrast,
cannot risk what Kantian teleology implies, namely, that the Other can be
thrust among the concepts that are used to describe nature. The way that the
Other confronts me as Other does not permit the Other to be assimilated to an
inhuman background. Idealists are generally opposed to pure solipsism, which
would abolish the Other in affirming ontological solitude. However, Kant and
his followers succumb to a variety of “metaphysical realism” when they tacitly
reintegrate the Other in a world of substance that does not allow for genuine
communication between members.27
After arguing that Kant has brought us to a philosophical impasse, Sartre
turns to more recent attempts to present the ontological status of the Other as
somehow basic to our understanding of the Self. Sartre contents that Edmund
Husserl’s admirable effort to show that “the Other is always there as a layer
of constitutive meanings” not only relates to the perception of subjects but
suggests as well that the self is experienced in relational terms.28 Husserl
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has performed an indispensable service in showing us that the question of
the Other’s existence cannot be relegated to secondary considerations with
regard to existence in general. However, Sartre contends that Husserl shares
with Kant a bias toward knowledge as the basic factor underlying my relation
to the Other, and that the being of the Other does not for this reason emerge
in his thought. Sartre returns to Hegel rather briefly only to criticize tenden-
cies toward totalization that offset any gains that might have been derived
from a dialectical approach to consciousness. While Hegel makes consider-
able progress in positing both Self and Other as mutually related, he fails to
describe the precise nature of ontological opposition: Self and Other are not
the same when existing separately as they are to one another. The true ground
for recognition is not knowledge but being: “Here as elsewhere we ought to
oppose to Hegel Kierkegaard, who represents the claims of the individual as
such.”29 And yet, we cannot by implication take up Heidegger’s ontological
approach to reality as a corrective to Hegel’s logicism. What Hegel’s system
lacks but allows us to envision is a position that does justice to the claims of
both realism and idealism. While each person can appear as an object to some-
one else, self-consciousness nonetheless allows for radical interiority. Hegel is
not wrong to emphasize the possibility of knowledge but in failing to concede
the importance of subjectivity: “In a word the whole point of departure is the
interiority of the cogito.”30
It is as a phenomenologist that Sartre provides us with the master metaphor
that allows him to reclaim the truth of the cogito while also insisting on the role
of the Other in the realization of personal objectivity. In a mental projection
of what might be a concrete situation, Sartre invites us to imagine him in a
public park. A man passes, appearing only briefly where there are benches.
The moment is fraught with ambiguity. On the one hand, the man is not easy
to distinguish from the trees and other objects that occupy the observer’s line of
vision. What allows us to say that the briefly appearing passerby is a man and
not a physical object? Sartre describes both the potential disintegration of the
observer’s world as a self-contained totality as well as the partial reconstitution
of another world that is no longer the same. Between these two worlds, the
observer notices how the man who looks at him does not turn toward him as
he might respond to a physical object. On the contrary, his response indicates
a veritable refusal to be seen as a mere thing: “A radical conversion of the
Other is necessary if he is to escape objectivity.”31 When this same moment of
interaction is considered with regard to the observer, we can better understand
why objectivity cannot derive from the world since the observer cannot be an
object for himself.
Sartre might be accused of overdramatizing the significance of this moment
in this imaginative version of what is occasionally experienced in everyday life.
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A similar sort of encounter is even presented in another description as danger-
ous, even life-threatening. Hence the sharp distinction between the observer
and the person observed can result in an almost pathological account of the
crucial encounter: “He is that object in the world which determines an internal
flow of the universe, an internal hemorrhage.”32 The purpose of this descrip-
tion, however, is not to suggest that the encounter with the Other results in a
fatality but to show how my objectivity requires the collapse of one world and
the experience of another before it can be internalized.33 This does not mean, of
course, that objectivity in every case presupposes an overt encounter between
unlike persons. But it does mean, quite simply, that I cannot speak of my world
until the Other invites me to experience the burden of self-consciousness.
Moreover, the sense that this revelation of “mineness” can be dislocating is
clearly suggested in Sartre’s peculiar use of language.
In a similar way, we learn about how this encounter can be appraised onto-
logically through the metaphor of an observer discovering that he is being
watched, which prompts him to seek cover in a deeper certainty of being that
ultimately evades him: “Here I am bent over the keyhole; suddenly I hear a
footstep. I shudder as a wave of shame sweeps over me.”34 What this means is
not that my relations with others are shameful but that the center of my being
has shifted from my own “inner” world to the sphere of the Other through
this encounter. This sudden shift in perspective, which deprives me of what-
ever security my solitude made possible, can be understood in two different
ways. On the subjective level, my response to being observed calls attention
to the being of consciousness that cannot be identified with knowledge. I do
not need to turn inward to realize that, in confronting the gaze of the Other,
my being bears a negative relation to objective knowing. On the other hand, I
cannot escape the gaze of the Other by returning to my solitude in a spirit of
forgetfulness: “My original fall is the existence of the Other.”35 Hence the gaze
of the Other is what precipitates the heightening of subjective awareness that
accompanies my attempt to twist free from what holds me captive.
The Other is originally the being through whom I become conscious of
being an object, rather than simply the token of my subjectivity. This experi-
ence seems to confirm Hegel’s conception of the relationship between Self and
Other on an elementary level. However, consciousness of the Other cannot be
known or represented; it lies “behind” my consciousness of being an object,
which points elsewhere. In truth, Husserl has already shown us that “the onto-
logical structure of ‘my’ world demands that it be also a world for others.”36
As a phenomenologist, Sartre intervenes at this point primarily to insist that
objectivity, whether mine or that of the Other, is the other side of an internal
negation that coincides with an original upsurge, that is to say, with being-for-
others. If my world escapes from me, I simply confirm the presence of the
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Other in the mode of objective being. I suffer an absolute loss when both self
and world suddenly escape me, bringing about the dissolution of my knowl-
edge and the confirmation of a freedom that is not my own. Hence objectivity
is less a shared perception than a fragile achievement that can easily dissolve,
since it does not solely depend on my consciousness.
At the same time, even while conscious of myself as an object, I possess
a sense of the Other as other than me and as a kind of “shadow” that relates
to my being in the mode of not being me. Sartre does not propose through
this description that the Other constitutes a metaphysical unknown that lies
“behind” consciousness as a “truer” world. However, the Other is in some
respects “behind the scenes” as I act on the stage of life, complicating my
attempt to present myself in concrete settings. The shadow that sometimes
appears in my midst is not the sign of my own absence but compares to a pro-
jection upon insubstantial material that cannot be assigned objective meaning.
Nonetheless, the Other bears a relation to my being instead of functioning as
an image of my presence. Sartre invites us to envision the Other as the writing
of freedom: “We are dealing with my being as it is written in and by the Other’s
freedom.”37
How are we to interpret Sartre’s metaphorical attempt to clarify both the
being of consciousness and the freedom of the Other? To be sure, Sartre uses
this metaphor to emphasize how the nothingness that seems to separate me
from my being announces the freedom of the Other, which I hope to enlist in
the process of being recognized. The recognition that might be anticipated in
this encounter would not be based on any prior knowledge but on a sense of
being that has no foundation. In “classical” modern philosophy from Descartes
through Hegel, the human subject is said to ground thought and, in differ-
ent ways, provide the foundation for all that we know. Sartre’s understanding
of freedom can be related to a non-foundational understanding of being that
places us in a peculiar relation to this modern tradition. Thus, in approach-
ing the question of human freedom, we hope to learn more about how Sartre
understands being-in-the-world and also to interpret his philosophy as a unique
adventure that unfolds in the vicinity of a basic modern concern.
I V
Our inquiry into Sartre’s unique approach to ontology allowed us to return to
one of his basic philosophical insights, which maintains that non-being resides
in the heart of being itself. My relationship to the Other encourages me to
anticipate a type of recognition that would allow the non-being that separates
us to form the being of a future recognition. However, this ontological hope
does not possess a definite foundation, so once again we are confronted with
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Sartre’s reluctance to use the word “being” as a means for securing a practical
resolution to my sense of homelessness. To the degree that the opposition of
“being” and “doing” allows us to grasp how “doing” better describes human
activity as inherently unstable, Sartre contends that the ethics of Kant is a mod-
ern achievement that prefigures his own position.38 In truth, the whole notion
that being can be interpreted as a foundation undergoes extensive criticism
in Sartre’s phenomenology of consciousness. In confronting various positions
that are central to the modern philosophical canon, Sartre demonstrates how
the question of being is only improperly reduced to a matter of unchanging
presence. Even consciousness cannot be posited as an entity that has the formal
meaning that is assumed in statements of abstract identity.
Hence, in examining Sartre’s arguments from a historical perspective, we
might also consider the possibility that a “classical” conception of being bears
a “postmodern” significance that could be further explored in multiple con-
texts. Louis Dupré has argued that the postmodern turn in recent philosophy
can be assessed as a response to a basic inconsistency in the modern épistemé,
which posits a sovereign subject on the one hand and static, unchanging reality
on the other.39 Thus, from one standpoint, the human subject is conceived as
wholly distinct and invested with powers that elevate it over the rest of cre-
ation. This tradition arguably culminates in the Absolute Idealism of Hegel,
who dispenses with the idea of the external world altogether. However, from
another standpoint, the external world is sometimes predicated as identical and
finite. Its invariant qualities are handed over to science, conceived as a body
of knowledge that more or less excludes the possibility of human intervention.
This tradition leads to the positivism of Auguste Comte and his followers who
ultimately consider the laws of physics to be those of society. It is obvious
that Sartre’s work cannot be placed in either of these two camps, which, taken
together, provide is with a useful, if contradictory, image of modernity itself.
We now would like to discuss how Sartre, as a precursor to the postmodern,
attempts to overcome this philosophical division in three ways.
First, Sartre helps us understand that the relationship between the for-itself
and the in-itself is basically an ontological one, rather than a matter of pulling
together two distinct entities. In the conclusion to his major early work, Sartre
raises the question of the ultimate relationship between the two basic terms
of his system. He acknowledges that being is not an abstraction but perpet-
ually engaged in the project of founding itself as self-cause (ens causa sui).
However, this project can only be glimpsed in terms of an ideal synthesis that
cannot be achieved in a manner that would constitute a practical totalization:
“Everything happens as if the in-itself and the for-itself were presented in a
state of disintegration in relation to an ideal synthesis.”40 If being is in a con-
stant state of destabilization, the best that we can do is simply to acknowledge
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the ideal aspect of our human aspirations while remaining aware that ultimate
totalization cannot be achieved. Dupré has argued that modern thought initi-
ated a new stage of reflection when it indicated a disparity in the very nature of
the real that Sartre has brought to our attention.41 Hence the irreducible differ-
ence between the in-itself and the for-itself, as well as the irresolvable nature
of their antagonism, foster a new ethical imperative: we must accept the prac-
tical significance of our longing for an ideal synthesis that remains forever out
of reach.
Such an imperative would be creative because it inscribes the role of free-
dom in the life that I assume as my own. This brings us to the second aspect
of Sartre’s position that distinguishes his thought from the rationalism of his
modern predecessors. “Lightness of being” does not allow me to evade my sit-
uation in good faith, but it reminds me that my basic life-project does not rest
on an external mandate that predates me: “This is because freedom is a choice
of being but not the foundation of its being.”42 The past invariably figures in any
attempt to “construct” a life that allows my actions to be interpreted in relation
to a future meaning. Sartre takes issue with Sigmund Freud’s psychic determin-
ism, but he values the method of psychoanalysis, which he adopts in suggesting
how my actions can “turn back” from the future in order to comprehend the
present.43 In a similar way, he also argues against all forms of economic deter-
minism, which deprive history of the crucial role that singular individuals
perform when “men reassume the past by making it a memorial.”44 It would
seem, therefore, that even the past can assume creative importance when its
“repetition” allows us to separate ourselves from what would otherwise unfold
as an impersonal process devoid of all subjective meaning.
The possibility of assigning the past a new meaning and thus transforming
the present in relation to future goals brings us to the third and final indica-
tion of Sartre’s disagreement with modern rationalism. Sartre’s appreciation
for Kant’s ethical system should not distract us from the significance of his
departure from the long tradition that interprets freedom in terms of law, if not
as equivalent to law. Hence, in Kant’s moral philosophy, freedom is defined
as clearly dependent on a concept of causality that derives from the natural
sciences. Dupré has remarked that, only recently, a small number of thinkers,
including Maurice Blondel, Paul Ricoeur and Karl Jaspers, have “begun to
rethink the relation between freedom and causality in noncausal terms.”45 Per-
haps in anticipating this recent effort to renew the question of transcendence,
Sartre no longer defines freedom as a mode of conduct that follows a causal
principle but invites us to imagine how it begins in a situation that does not
define it in advance: “Freedom is total and infinite, which does not mean that
it has no limits but that it never encounters them.”46 In other words, the lim-
its to freedom are those that it imposes on itself and that derive solely from
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facticity, the surrounding world and the techniques through which we com-
municate with others. By redefining freedom in this way, Sartre extends the
phenomenological critique of the “natural attitude” into the wellsprings of
human action.
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